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Social Security in Belgium: Distributive Outcomes∗ 
 
The paper analyzes the link between old-age income programs and economic outcomes in 
Belgium. We use a simulation methodology to construct an average pension generosity 
variable. Our regression analysis explores the link with distributional outcomes in income, 
consumption and more subjective indicators. Results document the weak link between 
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Even though the Belgian social security system initially belonged to the contributory 
Bismarckian tradition, it progressively became more and more redistributive. Today, 
replacement ratios are much higher for low-income earners than for workers with higher than 
average earnings, and internal rates of return vary a great deal across people. Pestieau and Stijns 
(1998) present Eurostat data from 1991 illustrating the net replacement rates of one- and two-
earner couples, ranging from as high as 91 per cent for a single-worker household earning two 
thirds of average wages to 53 per cent for an upper middle-class two-earner couple earning 
twice average earnings. These observations are confirmed by OECD data from 1997 and 1999 
for below-average earners showing replacement rates broadly in line with those of the previous 
authors. The increased degree of redistribution resulting from the social protection programs is 
the result of a series of factors. First, the social assistance program has seen its generosity 
increase over the years with strong increases both in levels and above-inflation indexation of 
benefits. Second, the social insurance programs have generated an increasing role for minimum 
benefit provisions. For example, minimum benefits have over the years become much more 
favorable for people with long careers but low earnings levels. Third, the main social insurance 
program, namely the one applicable to the wage-earners of the private sector, is characterized by 
a proportional contribution on all wages, whereas only those up to pensionable earnings enter 
the benefit formula, which accounts for a large part of the inherent redistribution of the system. 
Last, but not least, early retirement provisions have introduced yet another dimension to the 
redistributive nature of the systems, with strong redistribution occurring towards people retiring 
early from the labor force. In other words, the emphasis of the Belgian social system seems to 
have shifted from an insurance objective based on the Bismarckian example towards yet another 
tool of income redistribution. In a certain sense, social security is nowadays at least equally 
concerned with averting absolute and most of all relative poverty in old age by providing all 
workers with a sufficient income level, a fact mirrored by the strongly income-dependent 
replacement ratios. 
 
Against this backdrop, reforms that endanger the redistributive function of social security are 
hard to sell to increasingly conservative social partners. The word conservative has to be read 
and understood in its original sense, meaning a desire to preserve the current structures, rather 
than in the nowadays more common sense to describe political parties on the right of the 
political divide. Employers and employees have grown used to the advantages of massive early 
retirement with costs shifted to an all too willing government, as has again been illustrated in 
early 2005 by the "temporary" extension of early retirement provisions at age 56 for two more 
years for private sector workers.  
 
The objective of the present paper is to explore the effects of social security benefits on the 
well-being of elderly. Previous studies focused on two datasets, the Panel Survey of Belgian 
Households (PSBH) and an administrative dataset stemming from the tax administration. 
Delhausse and Perelman (1998) and Perelman et al. (1998) found evidence that poverty is no 
less prominent among the elderly than among the young, a finding that is totally consistent with 
the increased social spending and the explicitly redistributive nature of the Belgian social 
insurance system (see table 1). The indicators of poverty these authors use are the "poverty rate" 
- as defined to be the fraction of families with less than 50 percent of standardized median 
income - as well as the inter-quartile ratio of standardized income between the top and the first 
income quartiles. The main weakness of these indicators is that they exclusively focus on 
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income concepts, and thus only give a very partial view on people's well-being. Indeed, while 
income data might be easier to obtain, other parameters such as consumption levels as well as 
measures of subjective well-being might also be of interest. The present paper attempts to shed 
some light on these measures in the Belgian context by extending the range of indicators well-
beyond pure income-based indicators. 
 
 
Table 1: Poverty, inequality and age 
  Poverty Rate Interquartile ratio 
 Age   
PSBH (1994) All 4,7 3,31 
 60-70 6,2 3,60 
 70-80 4,4 3,17 
 80 + 5,5 3,07 
    
Fiscal data (1995) All 5,6  
 45-60 4,0  
 60+ 3,8  
    




In our regression analysis, we attempt to isolate the pure effects of the social insurance system's 
benefit generosity from other determinants of well-being such as wage income. To attain this 
objective, we focus our attention on people aged 65 and above. Below that age, wage income 
still represents the major income source for a non-negligible fraction of the population. The link 
between social insurance programs and the degree of well-being of the population is not an easy 
question. All things being equal we would expect that a generous social security system – 
generous in terms of average replacement ratio – generates more redistribution, less poverty 
than a less generous system. But things cannot be kept equal and one can show that for political 
economy reasons a contributory system is more likely to be more generous than a redistributive 
system.1 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the key features of the 
Belgian social security system. The following sections then describe the data we use for our 
analyses and the analysis thereof, before the final concluding section. 
                                                 
1  Pestieau, P. (2003), Social security and the well-being of the elderly. Three concepts of generosity, 
unpublished. 
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2. Basic features of the Belgian social security system 
 
The Belgian social security system has three major components, one for public employees, one 
for the self-employed and one for private sector employees. These are supplemented by a 
welfare scheme providing a minimum old age pension to individuals not entitled to any of the 
first three; this latter scheme is means tested. 
 
We start our brief overview of the institutional setting with the system covering private sector 
employees, the system that represents the majority of workers and pensioners in Belgium. 
Social security is financed by tax-deductible employer and employee contributions and 
government general revenue on a pay-as-you-go basis. Social security benefits are indexed to 
the cost of living and on an occasional and purely discretionary basis to the growth rate of the 
economy. The normal retirement age of the system is 65, with a transitory regime applicable to 
women until the year 2009. The normal retirement is progressively being shifted upwards to 65 
as a result of European Union requirements of equal treatment of the sexes and reaches age 63 
in 2005. De facto, this increase implies an important reduction of benefits for women as full-
career requirements as well as the averaging period becomes longer and hence more difficult to 
attain. The more relevant situation for our analysis is however the one in place prior to July 
1997 as most of the data at hand stem from that period.  
 
Benefits depend on the length of the work career (full benefits require 45 years, except for the 
transitory regime for women), on the marital status and on income, the latter being indexed to 
the present using cost-of-living adjustments, mostly based on price-indexation. There are 
ceilings and floors, applicable both to pensionable earnings and pensions. For example, a 
worker with yearly income of 33 000 € in 2003 (about the average) is entitled to a replacement 
ratio of 49% if married and 39% if single, granted that he is 65 years old and has a full career of 
45 years. (For a woman, in 2004, the normal retirement age is 63)2. 
 
Within the current pension system, retirement is possible as early as at 60 and continued work is 
possible after age 65 with the explicit consent of the employer. For example, a worker with the 
same income but being 60 years of age and having a 40-years-long career would be entitled to a 
replacement ratio of 46% if married and of 36% if single. 
 
This adjustment is simply due to the fact that the career is incomplete with a loss of pension 
rights equal the 5/45. Before 1997 the adjustment for such an early retirement within the 
window 60-65 was more important. For each year of early retirement there was a penalty of 5% 
of benefits. Before the age of 60, private sector employees can leave the labor force and get 
benefits. The standard exit routes are unemployment insurance and early retirement schemes, as 
well as to a lesser degree disability insurance. In Belgium, before 55, unemployment is the most 
popular way of retiring and after that age unemployment remains a possibility but there are also 
all kinds of early retirement schemes. The prominent role of unemployment insurance in the 
Belgian retirement landscape is a result of a special regime for old-age unemployed. In the past, 
it sufficed to be aged more than 50 to benefit from this preferential system which effectively 
gave this category of unemployed the privilege of a waiver from the requirement to search for a 
new job as well as the requirement to periodically report to the administration to maintain the 
status. The regime underwent some changes in the early years of the new millenium, with 
                                                 
2 Mercer (2003) 
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access to the full waivers being more restrictive and henceforth limited to people aged 58 and 
more. In previous work, Dellis et al (2004) have shown that these public programs (combined 
with the imagination of companies' human resource departments) explain early retirement quite 
well. 
 
Public sector pensions are on average much higher than those of private sector employees. They 
are taken out of the general federal revenue. Civil servants solely pay contributions at a rate of 
7.5% to cover survivors' benefits. In contrast to the private sector, retirement is mandatory at the 
latest at age 65 for both men and women. However, there exists a variety of ways of retiring 
earlier than at this age. First, retirement through disability insurance is possible. Opting for an 
incomplete career is also possible. Finally, there are special regimes for example for teachers, 
army and police employees. Here again, benefits are linked to income earned with ceilings and 
floors. Civil servants' benefits are continuously indexed not only to the cost of living, but also to 
productivity increases. However, it has to be said that the increasingly decentralized structure of 
the Belgian state has not been without consequences for the public sector pensions. With the 
transfer of competences to economic regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) and language 
communities (Dutch, French and German), wage bargaining has increasingly become 
decentralized. As a result, pay regimes and indexation rules have multiplied to a point where it 
is hard to keep track of the wide variety of regimes applicable.  
 
The self-employed retirement scheme is the newest and the least generous of the three. 
Furthermore, the normal retirement age for the self-employed workers is 65, again with a 
transitory regime for women. Earlier retirement is possible as of age 60, though much harder 
and linked to rather severe career requirements. Early retirement is also much less advantageous 
than in the other systems as benefits are not only adjusted through an incomplete career 
mechanism that is similar to the wage-earner scheme, but they are also adjusted downwards by 
5 per cent per year of anticipation. Further, the self-employed are not eligible for any of the 
other common pathways into retirement, namely unemployment insurance or special early 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.  Outcome data 
 
For the needs of our analysis of outcomes in terms of well-being, we use data from various 
sources that enclose both objective and subjective indicators.3 To get the best possible picture of 
the effects that the generosity of the retirement income systems might have on outcomes, we 
focus our attention on the people between the ages of 65 and 85.4 Table 2 summarizes the data 
sources, as well as the availability of the data over time.  
 
We distinguish a series of indicators of average well-being in a given year: income, 
consumption, happiness, health and the indicators of poverty. The interested reader find a series 
of plots describing the evolution of selected indicators of well-being over time in appendix A. 
By definition, these are indicators of average well-being across the entire population, and hence 
do not necessarily account for the wide variability within the population. Further, it has to be 
stressed that these are purely annual measures, which means that they do not take any life-cycle 
considerations into account. The latter remark is of a particular importance when thinking about 
the self-employed where the distinction between current and life-cycle income is likely to be the 
largest.  
 
Consumption data are drawn from the household budget survey (HBS) of the National Statistics 
office (INS). We have data from seven different waves at our disposal spanning the period from 
the late seventies to the year 2000. On the basis of this data, we compute three dependent 
variables: average consumption, relative poverty and absolute poverty. The data are grouped in 
two different ways. The first way of proceeding is to group people into pure age-cells. This way 
of proceeding is useful when regressing the INS data on observed benefit levels as such data are 
only available along a pure age-breakdown. The second way of proceeding, which is our 
preferred approach, is to group people into cells defined by education levels as well as by age. 
In this latter approach, the use of 5-year brackets instead of yearly groups helps us avoid 
insufficient cell-size. Our preference for the second approach resides in the fact that education 
levels help us to get a much more detailed picture of the differences among the Belgian 
population than a pure age indicator ever could do. 
 
The income data originates form the HBS (late 1970's and 1980's) as well as the Panel Survey 
of Belgian Households (PSBH) for later periods ranging from 1992 till 2001. Income data used 
in what follows has to be understood as after-tax income. For the same reasons as mentioned for 
the consumption data, we use two different groupings according to which independent variable 
we use in the regressions of outcomes in terms of well-being on system generosity indicators.  
 
Households are the units of observation in both the HBS and the PSBH. Therefore, all our 
analysis will be based on the household as the relevant economic unit. When computing average 
consumption and income levels, we apply OECD household equivalence scales to derive a 
measure of average disposable income in the household.  
We classify households into two categories, those with people aged 65 and more in the 
household that we call elderly households and those that have no household member aged 65 or 
above that we call non-elderly.  
When computing the household average income for all households with people aged 65 or 
                                                 
3 All EUR concepts in the present paper are expressed in 2001 EUR. 
4 No reliable data available above age 85.  
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more, we take the mean over the entire sample, weighting each household/family by the number 
of persons in the relevant age range.  To compute household mean income for those 65 and 
more, we take a weighted mean income over all households, where the weight is the number of 
persons aged 65 and more in the household.  So any household in which an elder resides gets 
some weight and weights increase with the number of elders living there, de facto person-
weighting the data. 
 
On the other hand, for measures of income and consumption for non-elderly households, we 
exclude any household containing an elderly person.  This way, the numbers derives for non-
elderly households is a pure measure of resources of the non-elderly, uncontaminated by 
potential spillovers resulting from the presence of elderly in the household.  Once again, we 
should weight the averages computed for groups of non-elderly by the number of persons in the 
household to get a person-weighted measure. 
 
Using this categorization into elderly and non-elderly households, we proceed to the definition 
of different measures of well-being, both absolute and relative:  
- Total household income/consumption 
- Absolute income/consumption poverty: share of elderly in households with 
income/consumption below a fixed threshold. The threshold is 40% of median non-
elderly income/consumption in earliest year of data, updated across time by the 
consumer price index to account for inflation. 
- Relative income/consumption poverty: share of elderly in households with incomes 
below 40% of the median income of non-elderly households.   
 
The two other data sources are more subjective as they summarize the perceived health and 
happiness reported by individuals. Health data originate from the Eurobarometer survey, a 
cross-national survey carried out over a wide range of European countries. Given its rather 
general nature and the relatively restricted sample size in the age-group of interest to us, we 
regroup the data on health status found in the surveys of 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2001 into 
one binary indicator of health and group people into five-year age-cells.5 
 
A priori, happiness is clearly the least objective but potentially the most accurate measure of 
well-being, as it captures not only the material situation an individual is in, but also the 
perception of the individual about his situation. As such, it is not found in the classical 
household surveys, with the only exception being the Eurobarometer survey. We use the life-
satisfaction question from this source to construct two indicators of happiness: the proportion of 
people that are very happy, and those that are very unhappy or not very happy. Surprisingly, 
happiness information is available for a wider time span than health information starting as 
early as 1973. 
                                                 
5 People responding that they are in very good or fairly good health standing are classified as "in good 

































































































































































































































































































































3.  Benefit data 
 
In line with the objective of the paper, we now define measures of benefit generosity that will 
serve as explanatory variables in the regression analysis of the next section.  
 
Benefit generosity is not a straightforward measure to use, as observed measures of generosity 
as measured in administrative data is not necessarily a valid data source. The reason for this 
skepticism with respect to actual data on generosity is that the data itself is already the result of 
a retirement decision, that in turn is again at least partly influenced by indicators of well-being 
we observe as a dependent variable on the left-hand side of our regression analysis.  
 
We thus proceed by a simulation methodology, whereby we use data from various sources to 
construct benefit indicators that are less problematic. The data sources at hand are listed in table 
3. Simulated pension benefits are the result of a weighted aggregation for a representative 
worker aged between 50 and 85 years over the period 1970 to 2002. We assume that his 
professional career was either as a wage earner, a civil servant or a self-employed with the 
corresponding weights. Due to a severe lack of data for individuals belonging to the self-
employed and the civil-servant systems, we focus on wage-earners in our discussion of 
simulation methodology. 6 
 
For the representative male we assume that he has a full career, which means that he paid social 
security contributions and accumulated the corresponding pension rights at each age, starting at 
age 20. For the representative female, the situation is slightly more complex. In the context of 
the wage-earner scheme, we consider three different situations to account for the wide 
variability in labor force participation rates for females: a full career scenario, an incomplete 
career pathway and a third case where we assume that the woman was never attached to the 
labor force. We compute the proportion of women belonging to each of these categories on the 
basis of labor force participation rates by age and cohorts. An incomplete career means that the 
representative person was at work, paid social security contributions and collected pension 
rights, for some years, and out of work for the rest of time. 7  
 
When a married woman had an incomplete career or was never attached to the labor force, we 
have to go one step further in our computation of benefits. Under the rules of the wage-earner, 
the self-employed and the means-tested pension schemes, husbands are entitled to a 
supplementary amount (equivalent to 25% of their pension) if their spouse has no earnings or is 
not beneficiary of social replacement allowances, including other social security pensions.8 This 
de facto means that married women with incomplete career abandon their own pension rights in 
favor of the supplementary spousal allowance, as their own pension rights are often smaller than 
this supplement. 
  
                                                 
6 We approximated the civil servant system by analogy with the wage-earner system. For self-employed, 
we had to rely in average date further limiting the information content of the data. For example, we 
cannot distinguish careers of men and women by lack of sufficient data for these two systems.  
7 For reasons of data tractability, we assume that the partial working career corresponds to a woman 
having positive, but lower earnings during the entire career rather than full earnings for part of the career. 
8 We do not consider the mean-tested, public pension scheme called GRAPA in our simulations of 
pension benefits given that the representative individual was entitled in all the analyzed situations to 
receive pension benefits higher than the guaranteed minimum. 
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The proportion of men and women in each pension scheme (wage-earners, civil servants and 
self-employed) by year and age cohort, was estimated using social security administrative 
sources. Given to the lack of available data, we do not consider mixed careers in these schemes. 
That means that our representative individual is assumed to belong to only one scheme over his 
entire professional life in contrast to the real world situation where mixed careers are not 
uncommon.  
    
Moreover we consider alternative pathways into retirement. On the one hand, we compute 
pension benefits for the three mentioned schemes taking into account early retirement 
provisions within these systems. On the other hand, we also simulate the alternative 
unemployment (from 50 to 65 years old) and other early retirement (from 58 to 64 years old) 
routes that are available to wage-earners outside of the official retirement system. Within each 
scheme average pension benefits for men and women at each age (50 to 85) and year are then 
aggregated using the observed path weights. Aged workers leaving the labor force prior to the 
earliest age at which they become eligible for benefits within any given pathway are assumed to 
receive benefits of zero euro. The weighting of the different pathways into retirement is based 
on the labor force participation rates in each year by the method of Latulippe as explained by 
Scherer.9 People younger than 58 leave through the unemployment insurance system, those aged 
58 and 59 through early retirement, those between the ages of 60 and 64 through a mix of early 
retirement and retirement regimes, and those aged 65 exclusively through regular retirement 
programs. For any given year, benefits of people aged more than 65 are computed on the basis 
of those of people aged 65 to which we apply an adjustment factor based on data from National 
Pension Office (ONP-RVP). 
 
To complete and enhance the information content of our benefit data, we do not restrict our 
attention to the baseline situation of one hypothetical synthetical individual of the entire 
population. We rather explore the data by separating people into education subgroups and 
income deciles within these education groups. We group people into then income and three 
education groups (those with primary, secondary and undergraduate degrees). We thus 
determine one synthetic earnings profile for each education/income subgroup, which leads us to 
a total of 30 profiles. Similarly, we compute profile-specific outcomes for these various profiles. 
 
The computation of the benefits for all people aged between 50 and 85 between the years 1970 
and 2002 relies on the baseline income pattern that is shifted up and down for the 30 subgroups 
to adjust for their relative income position. The data are price-indexed to take prices inflation 
into account and finally averaged over the 9 firts income deciles to finally produce the 3 benefit 
profiles that we use for most of our analysis. 
 
As it appears on Figures A-E of Appendix B, the profile of benefits over time is rather flat both 
on average and for specific years. Unsurprisingly, the profiles of observed and simulated 
benefits do not differ a great deal. Data on observed benefit levels are drawn from ONP-RVP 
files. We focus our attention on people who receive pensions exclusively from the wage-earner 
system between the ages of 60 (earliest retirement age) and 85 for the time-span ranging from 
1970 to 2001. Mixed careers are excluded and no distinction can be made according to 
education group, as no administrative dataset in Belgium records education levels. To our 
surprise, figure E reveals that expected benefits have not always been increasing in age. Further, 
                                                 
9 Scherer P., Age of withdrawal from the labour force  in OECD countries. OECD occasional paper, 49. 
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benefits at age 85 have been declining at times, indicating that incomplete price indexation 
might be an issue in the Belgian context. 
 
 
4. Regression analysis 
 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the key results of a series of regressions trying to explain a number 
of consumption- and income-related welfare indicators by the simulated benefits available. The 
data are separated into year, age and education level cells. For the purposes of the empirical 
analysis, we restrict our attention to individuals aged 65 and more.10  
 
Consumption exhibits strongly significant coefficients for the first two models (table4.1). The 
use of education dummies renders parameters insignificant. The same observations qualitatively 
hold true for relative poverty with a much less significant coefficient than consumption for the 
first two. The absolute poverty regression does not seem to lead to significant parameters in 
either specification. 
 
Table 4.1 Consumption regression (years 1979, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit 
  Coeff. 
 
t-value Number of obs. R-Square 
Consumption Linear 1.959 11.57 69 0.825 
 Age, Year dummies 2.016 11.96 69 0.847 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
-0.153 -0.42 69 0.921 
Relative Consumption Poverty Linear -0.680 -1.94 69 0.212 
 Age, Year dummies -0.822 -2.45 69 0.361 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
1.011 1.25 69 0.602 
Absolute Consumption Poverty Linear -0.235 -0.91 69 0.395 
 Age, Year dummies -0.360 -1.52 69 0.554 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
1.102 1.81 69 0.681 
 
Table 4. 2 Income regression (years 1979, 1988, 1992 to 2002) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit 
  Coeff. 
 
t-value Number of obs. R-Square 
income Linear 2.150 12.30 153 0.807 
 Age, Year dummies 2.350 13.25 153 0.840 
 Age, year, edu dummies -0.603 -2.15 153 0.922 
 Second level dummies 
 
-0.252 -0.96 153 0.951 
Relative income Poverty Linear -0.410 -1.97 153 0.494 
 Age, Year dummies -0.623 -2.87 153 0.558 
 Age, year, edu dummies -0.619 -1.30 153 0.579 
 Second level dummies 
 
-0.006 -0.01 153 0.729 
Absolute Income Poverty Linear -0.234 -1.16 153 0.537 
 Age, Year dummies -0.500 -2.36 153 0.591 
 Age, year, edu dummies -0.550 -1.17 153 0.604 
                                                 
10 For the interested reader we attach regressions with a cut-off age of 60 instead of 65 in Appendix C. 
Overall results are similar. 
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 Second level dummies 
 
0.123 0.30 153 0.796 
 
Table 4.2 contains the results of the income regressions. Because of the significantly larger 
number of observations, we perform one additional regression that does not only account for 
age and year dummies, but also second level dummies capturing the interaction of age and year 
on the one hand with the education dummy on the other. The use of education dummies in the 
regressions leads to non-significant parameters on the benefit variable, except for the income 
regression. In line with the findings for consumption, we mostly find significant coefficients 
when considering simple models with linear age trends or pure age dummies. 
 
The health data used in table 4.3 are grouped by year and age (5-years basis). As we do not have 
any information on education level for these observations, we limit our attention to the simple 
linear and dummy regression where the benefit variable represents the average of benefits 
available to people of different education levels. The life satisfaction data of table 4.3 are 
constructed the same way. We present results for both actual and simulated benefits. The table 
shows that life satisfaction seems to be strongly affected by actual and simulated benefits, while 
health does not seem to follow the same pattern. The result of an insignificant impact of benefits 
on health should however be read with some prudence. One the one hand, the extremely small 
sample size clearly limits the degree of significance of the parameter estimates. On the other 
hand, a casual look at graph 7 of Appendix A documenting a free fall of self-reported health 
status over the years should caution the reader about the quality of the Eurobarometer data on 
health.  
Table 4.3 Satisfaction and health regression (years 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2001 for health and 
1973, 1975 to 2001 for satisfaction) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit Actual benefit Number of 
obs. 





Fairly/Very good health Linear 0.774 0.13 -1.125 -0.26 20 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-6.576 -0.92 -5.485 -1.02 20 
Very happy Linear 4.959 22.92 4.216 23.10 214 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
4.943 21.47 4.201 21.09 214 
Unhappy/Very unhappy Linear -6.190 -9.98 -5.270 -10.01 178 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-6.774 -10.73 -5.729 -10.68 178 
 
 
We proceed with the analysis of the link between benefits and well-being using actual benefits 
in tables 5.1 and 5.2. These regressions are not directly comparable to the preceding ones and 
are thus presented in separate tables. The key difference lies in the fact that individuals' 




We continue to define age cells as five-year age groups for reasons of insufficiency of data for 
the income regressions, in line with the approach applied to simulated benefits.  For 
consumption on the other hand, we now have sufficient data to break age-cells down to a yearly 
basis and this way increase the richness of the data. 
Table 5.1 Consumption regression with actual benefits (years 1979, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000) 
Dependent variable Model Actual benefit 






Consumption Linear -0.121 -0.71 141 0.733 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
1.670 8.73 141 0.647 
Relative Consumption poverty Linear 0.694 1.76 141 0.160 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-0.984 -2.71 141 0.223 
Absolute Consumption poverty Linear 0.511 1.72 141 0.361 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-1.105 -3.89 141 0.347 
 
Table 5.2 Income regression with actual benefits (years 1979, 1988, 1992 to 2002) 
Dependent variable Model Actual benefit 




Income Linear -1.116 -3.71 47 0.905 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-2.074 -16.95 47 0.992 
Relative income poverty Linear 0.247 0.96 47 0.800 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
0.922 7.18 47 0.975 
Absolute Income poverty Linear 0.384 1.65 47 0.847 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
0.994 5.88 47 0.959 
 
The results we obtain are puzzling at best. Actual benefits only seem to have a significant 
decreasing effect on poverty when we use the dummy regression. In all other cases, signs we 
observe on the poverty coefficients tend to show the contrary, namely increased poverty as a 
result of increased benefits. Our main interpretation of these effects is that actual benefits have a 
negative impact on consumption poverty because the benefit measure is simply not the accurate 
one. Absolute poverty is most likely affected by benefits received by the poor, while relative 
poverty is also affected by the benefits received by the richest decile of the population. Using a 
single benefit measure for actual benefits corresponds to the use of an average benefit measure 
for the population, thus benefit levels that are closest to those of the middle classes and not of 
the extremes of the income distribution.  
 
This intuition for the surprising results is reinforced when performing another set of regressions. 
We now use simulated benefits by education group for the poverty regressions, but no longer 
measure poverty by age-group and education but simply by age. The regression  
 
Poverty = age + year + diploma2 + diploma3 + Benefits + Benefits*diploma2 + Benefits*diploma3 
 
We obtain the results of table 6 indicating that overall poverty indicators worsen when 
simulated benefits for the least educated increase. Simulated benefits correspond to a complete 
working career, meaning that we simply do not accurately capture the effect of benefits on the 
14 
poorest people in the overall population. Hence, our benefit measures are most valid when 
working with relatively homogenous cells. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are therefore an indication that 
benefits have the potential to decrease poverty within more homogenous cells. 
 
Table 6 Poverty, benefits and education 
Dependent variable 
 





































































































The purpose of this paper was to see how the social insurance retirement provisions affect the 
well-being of Belgian retirees. The results are hard to interpret and to some degree 
disappointing. They should however not be overvalued: given the crudeness of our benefit 
measure, particularly for the self-employed, it should not be surprising that the results are not 
more convincing. 
 
The poor quality of our indicators of well-being can be the explanation, but not the only one. It 
is not sure that with better data, with the ideal data, one would get good results. We expect that 
generous social security benefits have a positive effect on the average well-being of retirees and, 
all things being equal on poverty in old age. But things are not equal and further the relation is 
not instantaneous; it is likely to be based on some lifetime perception. Further, it is not sure 
whether our indicators of generosity are really the ones we need within the context of a study of 
the welfare effect of the retirement system. Our indicators of average generosity do not 
necessarily give a truthful picture of generosity to those most touched by the consequences of 
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Table C1 Consumption regression (years 1979, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit 
  Coeff. 
 
t-value Number of obs. R-Square 
Consommation Linear 1.488 9.84 87 0.756 
 Age, Year dummies 1.712 11.02 87 0.800 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
-0.345 -1.32 87 0.919 
Relative Consumption Poverty Linear -0.579 -2.33 87 0.245 
 Age, Year dummies -0.703 -2.80 87 0.407 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
0.131 0.24 87 0.613 
Absolute Consumption Poverty Linear -0.284  -1.51 87 0.433 
 Age, Year dummies -0.330 -1.81 87 0.588 
 Age, year, edu dummies 
 
0.359 0.86 87 0.692 
 
Table C2 Income regression (years 1979, 1988, 1992 to 2002) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit 
  Coeff. 
 
t-value Number of obs. R-Square 
income Linear 1.270 9.35 192 0.726 
 Age, Year dummies 1.862 12.50 192 0.797 
 Age, year, edu dummies -0.279 -2.06 192 0.941 
 Second level dummies 
 
-0.267 -2.16 192 0.963 
Relative income Poverty Linear -0.422 -3.09 192 0.423 
 Age, Year dummies -0.397 -2.39 192 0.475 
 Age, year, edu dummies 0.435 1.76 192 0.585 
 Second level dummies 
 
0.708 3.37 192 0.774 
Absolute Income Poverty Linear -0.225 -1.77 192 0.529 
 Age, Year dummies -0.348 -2.25 192 0.571 
 Age, year, edu dummies 0.033 0.14 192 0.611 
 Second level dummies 
 















Table C3 Satisfaction and health regression (years 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2001 for health and 
1973, 1975 to 2001 for satisfaction) 
Dependent variable Model Simulated benefit Actual benefit Number of 
obs. 





Fairly/Very good health Linear -0.199 0.05 -2.819 -0.95 25 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-5.87 -0.93 -4.827 -1.47 25 
Very happy Linear 5.038 27.04 4.242 27.44 270 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
5.040 25.81 4.233 26.07 270 
Unhappy/Very unhappy Linear -6.830 -12.76 -5.759 -12.89 229 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-7.355 -13.78 -6.181 -13.89 229 
 
Table C4 Consumption regression with actual benefits (years 1979, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000) 
Dependent variable Model Actual benefit 






Consumption Linear 0.047 0.40 176 0.742 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
1.187 7.17 176 0.585 
Relative Consumption poverty Linear 0.161 0.60 176 0.170 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-0.789 -2.81 176 0.221 
Absolute Consumption poverty Linear 0.001 0.00 176 0.377 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-0.931 -4.12 176 0.329 
 
Table C5 Income regression with actual benefits (years 1979, 1988, 1992 to 2002) 
Dependent variable Model Actual benefit 




Income Linear -0.654 -2.60 59 0.914 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
-1.789 -14.37 59 0.989 
Relative income poverty Linear 0.742 2.72 59 0.622 
 Age, Year dummies 
 
1.373 8.01 59 0.926 
Absolute Income poverty Linear 0.489 2.42 59 0.819 
 Age, Year dummies 
 









Table C6 Poverty, benefits and education 
Dependent variable 
 













































































Age, years dummies 
0.039 
(0.18) 
0.985 
(6.69) 
0.015 
(0.06) 
-0.079 
(-0.50) 
0.177 
(0.67) 
-0.211 
(-1.35) 
176 
 
176 
 
0.821 
 
0.942 
 
